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Abstract 
The pace of economic engagement between China and Africa has increased exponentially in recent 
years, fueled mostly by burgeoning trade and investment ties. This impressive transformation of 
Sino-African relations has been complemented significantly by China’s “Going Global” policy, 
resulting in a huge number and diversity of Chinese multinational companies on the African continent. 
This proliferation of Chinese companies in Africa has generated new opportunities and prospects for 
all stakeholders, but has also engendered a host of challenges. This has no doubt had a significant 
impact on both the making and shaping of China’s foreign policy in Africa, and subsequently China 
Africa relations as a whole. This study relies on an extensive review of available qualitative and 
quantitative data to gain insights into the complex institutional and operational framework behind 
Chinese government support for the international ambitions of Chinese companies in Africa. What are 
the motives behind Beijing’s “Going Global” Policy? Which key institutions are involved, and what 
policy tools are employed to encourage the overseas investments of Chinese companies? What are the 
key drivers behind Chinese companies’ foray into the African market and what are the implications for 
China Africa relations, both in the short-term and long-term? These and other essential questions are 
addressed in this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s relationship with Africa has evolved in several stages over many decades and has been driven 
by ideological, political, economic and security interests. From the early 1950s to mid-1970s, often 
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deemed the revolutionary period, China’s relationship with Africa was mostly driven by ideological 
and political concerns. From the 1980s, China’s relations with Africa was characterized by rigorous 
and open interaction with all African states. The “reform and opening up” policy embarked on by then 
President Deng Xiaoping propelled China’s economic growth and ushered the way towards China’s 
status as a global manufacturing hub, the world’s second largest economy, and a regional and global 
power (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012, pp. xi-xii). This transformation had a direct impact on China’s Africa 
policy, the most obvious being in the area of commerce. Africa has become a vital source of raw 
materials for Chinese factories and at the same time a destination market for Chinese products. In time 
it has also become an investment destination for numerous Chinese companies. 
At the fore-front of this increasing economic engagement with Africa are numerous Chinese 
multinational companies, both state-owned and private. The scale and volume of their investment 
activities differs from country to country and varies by sector, but it is nonetheless a continually 
growing phenomenon across the African continent. Both China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
private sector accounted for $14.7 billion Foreign Direct Investment as of 2012, a growth of more than 
60 percent from 2009. Overall, China’s investment in Africa has exceeded $40 billion in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), through various kinds of investments (Shinn, 2012). Today, these state-owned 
companies and private sector businesses have supplemented the Chinese government’s role in areas 
spanning trade, investment and large scale infrastructure construction. The majority of Chinese 
investments has traditionally been focused on energy, mining, construction and manufacturing, and 
State-owned companies like the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC) have made huge 
inroads into Africa with investments running into the tens of billions of dollars (Shinn, 2012). 
Over the years the Chinese government has continually enacted policies to further bolster the capacities 
and capabilities of both private and state-owned Chinese companies. This has no doubt played a crucial 
role in expanding the scope and scale of Chinese business activities in Africa. Government ministries 
and agencies as well as a string of financial institutions have been an instrumental part of this strategy. 
Notable among the political institutions are the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). Key financial institutions include China Exim Bank, China Development Bank (CDB) and 
China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund). 
Perhaps the best example of specific government policy initiative aimed at encouraging the overseas 
expansion of Chinese companies is the “Going Global” policy. The first formal reference to the policy 
occurred in the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) Opinion on the Formulation of 
the 10th National Economic and Social Development Five Year Plan (the Opinion) adopted in 
December 2000. The plan was eventually included in the 10th Five Year Plan, and subsequently in the 
2006 11th Five Year Plan.  
The implementation of the Going Global strategy has provided great impetus and support to Chinese 
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businesses to look towards the global landscape. It also set the trend for policies in the succeeding 10 
years and began a new chapter for overseas investment by China (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 10). For 
example, in November 2004, the NDRC and the Export-Import Bank of China co-issued a decision to 
“provide credit support to the key overseas investment projects encouraged by the state”. These key 
projects fall into four categories: resource related, export driven, research and development, and merger 
and acquisition ventures. The Director of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC), Li Rongrong mentioned that, backed by this national 
financial support, “in 2005, a dozen large-scale and competitive central enterprises went out and signed 
tens of energy and resource contracts”. Among these central enterprises are SOE oil giants CNPC, 
Sinopec and CNOOC, which are actively acquiring overseas resource assets as part of China’s energy 
security policy (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008, pp. 3-4). 
The Chinese government has therefore placed a lot of emphasis on providing support for the overseas 
expansion of Chinese companies. This can be seen largely as a way to advance its foreign policy and 
security agenda. It is also an all-encompassing policy as it pertains to both state-owned and private 
companies, and has over the years propelled countless Chinese multinational companies to look 
towards Africa as an investment destination. 
The extensive proliferation of Chinese multinational companies in Africa is therefore a consequence of 
China’s going global outward investment strategy. Although China’s Going-Global policy has played a 
huge role in China’s commercial motives and therefore has had a growing impact on China’s foreign 
policy, there has been a lack of critical analyses into the inner workings, policy apparatus and 
institutional framework of China’s “Going-global” policy and its role within the wider context of China 
Africa relations. An overwhelming majority of the literature has focused mostly on China’s 
overarching policy goals in Africa and its overall impact. As can be expected, the scholarship in this 
regard is polarized between two factions: the optimists, who have highlighted the opportunities 
accruing to China’s increasing presence, and the skeptics, who emphasize on what they call the 
“exploitative” nature of Chinese engagement on the continent. Consequently, much of the literature has 
tended to provide an over-simplification of the impact of China’s increasing presence. As Daniel Large 
notes, “The effect is often emotively to describe China’s rise in Africa in terms of a monolithic Chinese 
dragon in an un-variegated African bush stripped of historical and political content” (Large, 2008, p. 
46). 
In the same vein, Li Anshan, a prominent China-Africa scholar, has noted the popular perception in the 
West that the recent rapid developments of the Sino-African relationship have arisen after a long, 
dormant period, and that its recent re-emergence reflects a set of ambitious and unsettling goals on the 
continent that include a quest for energy, trade and geopolitical interests. In his opinion, such 
viewpoints fail to convey the most important elements in Sino-African relations, saying “that the 
development of the relationship over the past 50 years has been based on ‘equal treatment, respect for 
sovereignty and common development’ and that ‘Sino-African relations’ are not new—dating back to 
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ancient times and progressing gradually based on common historical experiences”. He does admit 
though, that China’s foreign policy and more specifically its African policy has been informed by its 
development strategy, and has over the years undergone a triple transformation: a change from 
ideological emphasis to ideological neutrality, from unitary form to multiple channels in bilateral 
exchange and from single aid to win-win strategy in the field of cooperation (Li, 2007, p. 70). 
By far, the most frequently cited driver of Chinese engagement in Africa is energy security, a point 
which is emphasized by Chris Alden and Cristina Alves: “It is neither a secret nor a revelation that 
China’s energy concerns have been playing an increasingly crucial role in its foreign policymaking in 
the new century” (Alden & Alves, 2009, p. 4). Ian Taylor points out in support of this view: “indeed, 
the abundance of natural resources in Africa has led Beijing to seek long-term deals with African 
governments that ensure continued access to all its raw materials and sources of energy” (Taylor, 2009, 
p. 19). 
Chris Alden et al. describe the key factors propelling Chinese engagement in Africa as a combination 
of domestic Chinese dynamics, a desire to expand into new markets and international political factors, 
but that “the overarching driver has been the Chinese government’s strategic pursuit of resources and 
attempts to ensure raw material supplies for growing energy needs within China, in part reflecting the 
country’s position as a centre of global manufacturing” (Alden et al., 2008, pp. 6-7). 
China’s search for resource security has in essence become a major focus of its foreign policy, and “in 
this regard, Africa has assumed a critical role in achieving this objective” (Alden & Alves, 2009, p. 5). 
Some authors have even gone as far as to suggest that the quest of energy and resource security has 
become the sole objective of the Chinese government’s foreign policy in Africa. Chietigj Bajpaee for 
instance, believes that “China’s political, economic and military relations with Africa have been 
subordinated to its quest to secure energy resources” (Bajpaee, 2005). Jean Kachiga counters this 
assertion, arguing that such an interpretation of China’s approach in Africa is limited to a myopic view 
that only takes the current developments into account, and fails to consider both the long history of 
China-Africa relations and the complexity of China’s involvements in the continent (Kachiga, 2013, p. 
49). Nonetheless, the success of China’s resource diplomacy in Africa has been acknowledged by all, 
and can be seen in its increasing presence across the length and breadth of the continent, especially in 
resource rich countries. Compared to the 1990s, China today is a force to reckon with in Africa with oil 
leases and mining concessions, but is increasingly making bold forays into other diverse sectors like 
agriculture, construction, financial services and manufacturing.  
Consequently, through the Going-global policy, China’s commercial interests have become 
increasingly intertwined within the broader political and economic confines of many African states. 
Consequently, this paper will seek to answer the following questions: What are the motives behind 
Beijing’s “Going Global” Policy? Which key institutions are involved, and what policy tools do they 
employ to encourage the overseas investments of Chinese companies? How much leverage does the 
Chinese government have over the activities of its companies in Africa and what are the implications 
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for China Africa relations, both in the short-term and long-term? These and other essential questions 
will be addressed in this paper. 
 
2. Methods and Sources 
The entirety of this paper is based on secondary sources of information. In particular, Chinese 
government sources including policy papers and documents from bodies and agencies such as the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) are 
utilized. Additional sources include official pronouncements from speeches as well as proceedings 
from high-level meetings and conferences. The paper also made use of published materials from books, 
journals, reports and seminars. In addition, a critical review of findings from various case studies from 
different sources was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding into the policy and institutional 
framework that drives China’s “Going Global” policy in Africa. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 The Great Leap Outward: China’s “Going Global Policy” in Perspective 
China’s investment policies have frequently changed over time, with initiation of new policy and 
changes in strategic directions. In the immediate aftermath of the formation of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, restrictive investment policies as a consequence of the state planning system, coupled 
with a lack of investment resources resulted in very limited outward investment activity. However, 
China’s opening up and reform initiated by Deng Xiaoping led to many changes in Chinese 
government policy, which has over the years shaped and directed the degree of internationalization of 
Chinese MNCs. Today, outward investment is a key focus of the Chinese government, especially since 
the announcement of the going global policy in 2000 (Buckley et al., 2007, p. 47). 
This strategy was launched as part of the 10th Five-Year plan in 2001, the same year that China acceded 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The president of China at the time, Jiang Zemin detailed the 
objectives of the plan as increasing outward direct investment, undertaking construction and 
engineering projects abroad, and exporting labor services. Some of the most obvious measures in that 
direction included the relaxation of investment restrictions abroad and the increase in financial support 
for corporate champions. 
The first formal reference to the strategy however, was said to have occurred in the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) Opinion on the Formulation of the 10th National 
Economic and Social Development Five Year Plan (the Opinion) adopted in December 2000. As the 
first formal reference to the going out strategy, the Opinion, in its 12th Article stated the following as 
one of the goals of the Five Year Plan: 
“Implement the ‘go-global’ strategy, and strive to achieve new breakthroughs using 
domestic and foreign resources and markets. Encourage outward investment that can 
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bring into play China’s comparative advantage, widen the areas, channels and methods 
of economic and technical cooperation, support the transnational operations of 
competitive enterprises to go abroad to develop processing trade and develop resources, 
and provide help in the areas of loans, insurance, etc. Grasp firmly the formulation and 
regulation of the system of supervision for domestic enterprises going abroad to invest, 
strengthen the administration of Chinese companies abroad and the coordination of 
investment services” (Freeman, 2008, pp. 4-5). 
The plan was eventually included in the 10th Five Year Plan, and subsequently in the 2006 11th Five 
Year Plan. The Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for national economic and social development 
highlighted the following seven needs: 
i. To encourage overseas investments to enhance China’s competitiveness and expand the 
scope and modalities of China’s international economic and technical cooperation; 
ii. To continue to develop overseas project contracting and labor service cooperation, and 
encourage competitive companies to explore processing and trading overseas, thereby 
promoting export of products, services and technology; 
iii. To support companies in exploring resources overseas that were in short supply 
domestically and promote adjustment of the sectoral structure of resources trade; 
iv. To encourage the use of foreign intellectual property resources to establish research and 
development and design operation centres overseas; 
v. To support capable companies in developing transnational operations to achieve 
internationalized operations to achieve internationalized development; 
vi. To improve the overseas investment service system and create a good investment 
environment for companies through improvements in systems governing finance, 
insurance, foreign exchange, taxation, intellectual property rights, laws and regulations, 
information services and entry and exit management; and 
vii. To improve corporate governance structures and internal regulatory mechanisms to regulate 
and supervise overseas investments (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 9). 
Section 1 of Chapter 37 of the Five Year Plan spells out China’s going out strategy as follows:  
“Support qualified enterprises to engage in outward direct investment and global 
operations. Give priority to competitive industries, provide guidance to enterprises to 
engage in overseas processing trade, promote the diversification of products’ places of 
origin. Cultivate and develop Chinese multinational corporations through international 
mergers and acquisitions, equity participation, public listing, restructuring and 
consolidation, etc. Enhance cooperative development of overseas resources based on the 
principles of complementary strengths, equality, and mutual benefits. Encourage 
enterprises to participate in infrastructure construction overseas, improve the level of 
project contracting overseas, and steadily develop labour cooperation. Improve the 
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outward investment promotion and security system, strengthen the coordination of 
overseas investments, risk management and the supervision of state-owned assets 
overseas” (National People’s Congress, 2006). 
According to Huang Wenbin and Andreas Wilkes: 
“this document marked the birth of China’s Going Out strategy and the comprehensive 
development of China’s overseas investments. It also set the trend for policies in the 
succeeding 10 years and began a new chapter for overseas investment by China. 
Supported by this new strategy, overseas investment grew significantly, attracting the 
attention it receives today” (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 10). 
The going out policy was subsequently featured in the annual economic development plans passed by 
the National People’s Congress. While the Five Year Plans do not spell out any specific policy details 
as regards the going out strategy, numerous official documents have been released with specific policy 
guidelines, regulations and incentives to encourage Chinese companies to go global. One of such 
documents is the Nine Principles on Encouraging and Standardizing Outward Investment, released by 
the State Council in October 2007. The document sets out initiatives to “encourage qualified 
enterprises to actively and steadily participate in international economic and technological 
cooperation … in order to seize economic globalization and regional cooperation opportunities”.  
In 2006, the Chinese government, through the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), the Ministry of Commerce and other government agencies, released the Outward Investment 
Direction Policy (the Outward Investment Policy) in a bid to define the basic policy on outward 
investment. The Outward Investment Policy was created: 
“in order to accelerate the implementation of the ‘Going Global’ strategy, to promote 
effective, orderly, coordinated and sound development of outward investment, and to 
provide guidance on the direction of outward investment” (NDRC et al., 2006). 
The document reiterates the Chinese government’s commitment towards the internationalization efforts 
of Chinese companies in Article Two as follows:  
“China encourages and supports enterprises of all categories with competitive 
advantages to make outward investment. In order to increase enterprises’ international 
competitiveness and cooperative participation, deepen exchange and cooperation with 
other countries, and promote development for all, China encourages the optimal 
utilization of both domestic and international markets and the optimal allocation of 
resources through outward investment” (NDRC et al., 2006). 
The Outward Investment Policy identifies enterprises as the subjects of outward investment, and that in 
their outward investment initiatives, they should:  
“conform to principles of market economy and common international rules, uphold the 
principles of complementary strengths and mutual benefits, comply with local laws and 
regulations, establish a good international reputation, and take adequate precautions 
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against risks of all kinds” (NDRC et al., 2006). 
Among other things, the document stipulates the sectors in which outward investment is encouraged, 
allowed or prohibited, provides policy support for the encouraged sectors and spells out the basic goals 
of the government in encouraging outward investment. The sectors that are encouraged are:  
i. Those that can acquire resources or raw materials for which there is domestic shortage and 
which is required urgently for the development of the national economy. 
ii. Those that can promote the exports of domestic products, equipment or technology in 
which China enjoys a comparative advantage, as well as the export of labor services. 
iii. Those which can significantly improve China’s technological, research and development 
capability, as well as make use of internationally advanced technology, advanced 
management experience and professionals (NDRC et al., 2006). 
The Outward Investment Policy includes a Catalogue of Encouraged Outward Investment which details 
the encouraged sectors. These cover a wide range of industries including agriculture, mining and 
quarrying, manufacturing, services and others. 
The activities that are encouraged in the agricultural sector include planting of natural rubber, planting 
of oil-seeds, cotton, and vegetables, harvesting, transportation and cultivation of timber, animal 
husbandry, especially breeding of quality varieties of breeder animals, breeder birds and aquatic 
offspring, and ocean fishery, including ocean fishing and ocean mariculture. The activities encouraged 
in the mining and quarrying industry include prospecting and exploitation of petroleum, natural gas, 
iron, manganese, chromium, copper, bauxite ores, lead, zinc, nickel, cobalt, titanium, vanadium, 
niobium, tin, gold, silver, uranium ore, salt, phosphate sulfur, boron ore, coal, oil sand, oil shale heavy 
oil, diamond, graphite, etc. The activities encouraged in the manufacturing industry include textiles, 
clothing, footwear and other leather goods, furniture, agricultural machines, paper, industrial chemicals, 
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, smelting, satellites, industrial machinery, cement, vehicles, electronics and 
many others. The activities encouraged in the service sector include global marketing network, ocean 
freight transport, construction and operation of communications network, software development and 
application service, research of new and high technologies and new and high tech products, 
trans-border highway and railroad transportation, and construction and operation of trans-border 
highways, railroads and bridges, journalism, radio programs, films, television programs, and the spread 
of culture and art that increases publicity of the Chinese culture (NDRC et al., 2006). 
The investments that are prohibited are those that: 
i. Endanger national security and hurts public interests; 
ii. Utilize techniques or technologies that are prohibited by China from exportation; 
iii. Are in areas of operation prohibited by Chinese law; 
iv. Prohibited from receiving investment by the law of the hosting country, other industries 
prohibited by the international treaties that China has concluded or taken part in; 
v. Prohibited by law, administrative law, or regulation (NDRC et al., 2006). 
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Aside from the sectors that are encouraged or prohibited, all other sectors are “permitted”. Investments 
that fall into the encouraged sectors receive policy support, while those in the permitted sectors do not 
receive any support, though they may be undertaken. Article 8 of the Outward Investment Policy 
details policy initiatives aimed at providing support and incentivizing companies to pursue the 
aforementioned encouraged investment projects. For these investments, “the state shall provide policy 
support in macroeconomic control, multilateral and bilateral economic and trade policy, diplomacy, 
finance, taxation and foreign exchange, customs, resources and information, credit and loan, insurance, 
and bilateral and multilateral cooperation and foreign affairs, etc.” (NDRC et al., 2006). 
One of the foremost means of providing policy support is the Special Funds for Foreign Economic and 
Technical Cooperation. These funds are overseen by the Ministry of Finance and MOFCOM at the 
central and local level and are used to support outward investment and other activities such as 
agricultural, forestry and fisheries cooperation, civil engineering contracting, labor services, the 
establishment of high and new technology development platforms and design consulting. In line with 
these funds, outward investment is defined as investment by Chinese enterprises outside China to 
establish an enterprise, or obtain ownership or management rights over an enterprise, or rights to 
products of an enterprise by means of a newly established business entity, acquisition, merger or share 
participation (Freeman, 2008, pp. 6-7). 
Practically, there are two main types of financial support for outward investment. They include direct 
support for costs and interest subsidies. Support for costs are given either for pre-investment expenses 
or operating costs, depending on the nature of the investment. Some investment projects do not qualify 
for all types of support. Generally, they may only receive support for pre-investment expenses and 
interest payments, but not operating costs. Subsidies for pre-investment expenses on the other hand are 
given to enterprises involved in outward investment, cooperative projects in agriculture, forestry or 
fisheries, contracting, labor services, high or new technology research and development platforms and 
design consultancy. The pre-investment expenses that qualify for subsidies include the costs for 
obtaining third party legal, technical or business consulting services, surveys or investigations, project 
feasibility studies and the purchase and translation of regulatory documents and specifications. The 
subsidies given for pre-investment costs may not exceed 50% of the actual expenses on the required 
services (Freeman, 2008, p. 7). 
Support for operating costs is principally not available for outward investment projects, but to 
enterprises engaged in labor services, development of foreign high and new technology research and 
development platforms and design consultancy. In the case of research and development platforms, the 
support is available for the leasing or purchase of offices, laboratories and equipment, and also the 
acquisition of data concerning high and new technology, again with a limit of 50% of actual costs. 
High and new technology research and development platforms are defined as entities for research and 
development or experimental development created by Chinese enterprises outside China through new 
establishment, acquisition or merger abroad to engage in basic research, product application research 
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and high technology research (Freeman, 2008, p. 7). 
Interest rate subsidies are applied to interest on loans for enterprises that engage in outward investment 
or cooperative projects abroad in agriculture, forestry and fisheries. To qualify for interest rate 
subsidies, the loans must be medium or long term loans with a period not less than one year from a 
domestic Chinese bank. The total amount of the loan in question should not be more than the 
investment by the Chinese party or the contract amount and the subsidy may not exceed five years. In 
principle, the interest rate subsidy for RMB loans may not exceed the People’s Bank of China base rate 
in effect and for foreign currency loans it cannot exceed 3% (Freeman, 2008, p. 7). 
The government periodically makes changes to its policy support for outward investments. For 
example, in 2006 there was an increase in the number of forms of support with the introduction of new 
directives. One of these was a 20% subsidy for the transport of raw materials to China for enterprises 
engaged in the exploitation of raw materials. To qualify for this subsidy, the raw materials in question 
must be transported by a Chinese enterprise with an equity interest, and must fall within the following 
resources: oil, natural gas, iron, copper, aluminium and other metals, and also forestry and fisheries 
resources. A subsidy was also introduced for the cost of personal accident insurance for Chinese 
personnel working outside China and subsidies were also permitted for the cost of personnel required 
to be sent outside China to handle events of force majeure such as terrorism, war and natural disasters. 
Again in 2006, the maximum amount of subsidies a single enterprise could receive in any one year was 
limited to RMB20 million. Investment projects that can receive support are also limited by the value of 
the total investment. So for foreign investment projects, the Chinese party’s investment must not be 
less than US$1 million or its equivalent, while for foreign high or new technology development 
platforms, the contract amount must be not less than US$500,000 (Freeman, 2008, pp. 7-8). 
The Outward Investment Policy has also targeted specific sectors in other ways. One of the earliest to 
be encouraged was investment in processing trade. A number of measures on this sector were adopted. 
However, the Chinese government does not generally provide specific sector and country specific 
incentives for outward investment rather than the supports available for encouraged investment sectors. 
What it does though, is provide guidance on targeted countries and sectors in them. These are based on 
what the Chinese government views as preferred sectors for investment in various destination countries. 
For example, in the past the government has tried to guide Chinese companies to invest in the assembly 
of consumer electronics and the Middle East and Europe and textile processing in Africa, Latin 
America and Europe. Subsequently, the government has released more comprehensive catalogues of 
countries and target sectors in which Chinese companies are encouraged to invest. These catalogues are 
however, only for guidance. In addition, market analyses, guides to the legal environment and 
investment barrier reports for many countries are made available by the government to support Chinese 
companies in their investment decisions (Freeman, 2008, p. 8). 
The Outward Investment Policy document further details government policy regarding prohibited 
outward investment projects in Article 9, stating that the state will not grant approval for such projects, 
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and will take the necessary measures to prevent and stop such projects (NDRC et al., 2006). 
The impact of the going out policy was felt soon after its implementation. Notably, China’s ODI stock 
reached approximately US$36 billion and ranked sixth among 118 emerging economies by the end of 
2002. In 2004, the government began a gradual liberalization of the ODI regulatory regime with the 
“reform of the investment system”. This reform was aimed at decentralization of investment 
verification and approval at the provincial level, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, and stimulus 
packages to ease the transition of Chinese companies onto the world stage (Bowman et al., 2013, p. 8). 
The going global strategy was effective in its ability to motivate Chinese companies to actively seek 
and acquire foreign assets and equity interests in contrast to merely trading in global commodities and 
raw materials. This has guaranteed China a market presence in virtually every country in the world, 
further raising China’s geopolitical profile as a key investor across different markets and industries all 
over the world.  
The effects of the going out policy can also be seen from the rapid growth in China’s exports and 
international market pervasion. In 1968 China’s share of the world market was negligible; in 1998 it 
had less than 2% of the world market share, and by 2010 China ranked first in international exports, 
with a world market share of 10.4% (Bowman et al., 2013, p. 9). Chinese companies foray into 
international markets continues to this day, evidenced by the increasingly global presence of numerous 
Chinese companies. In 1995, there were only 3 Chinese companies in the Fortune 500 list but by 2011 
there were 61. Government controls over Chinese companies’ investment and management decisions 
have been relaxed significantly while overall government supervision is less effective stemming from 
the break up of links between ministries in charge of specific industries and enterprises, and the 
corporatization and partial public listing of big SOEs. By 2005, there were more than 7000 Chinese 
enterprises investing in 160 countries around the world, with a total outward foreign investment stock 
and flow estimated at US$50 billion and US$5 billion respectively. Outgoing FDI in turn, grew from 
US$2.7 billion in 2002 to US$57.9 billion in 2010 (Power et al., 2012, p. 104). 
In line with this trend, Africa has witnessed a surge in Chinese investment across all sectors of the 
economy. Chinese FDI has grown from $1 billion in 2004 to $35 billion in 2015, according to official 
figures. This represents an impressive, average annual growth rate of 40 percent (Sun et al., 2017, p. 
20). At the current growth rates, it is estimated that China will become Africa’s largest source of FDI 
stock within the next decade. Viewed from a country-level perspective, Chinese investment in Africa 
has recorded growth rates of more than 52 percent a year in Ethiopia, 59 percent a year in South Africa, 
and 89 percent a year in Angola from 2004 to 2014 (Sun et al., 2017, p. 22). 
Especially notable are investments in infrastructure. Numerous examples abound of mega projects 
financed and undertaken by Chinese companies in Africa. In 2015, Chinese companies committed $21 
billion into African infrastructure projects. This figure surpassed the combined total investment of the 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, whose members include the African Development Bank, the 
European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the 
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World Bank, and the Group of Eight (G8) countries. Examples of key projects financed by Chinese 
institutions include the $3.8 billion Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya, as well as the 
$1.7 billion Karuma Hydroelectric Power Station in Uganda. Overall, Chinese contractors make up 
almost half of Africa’s international Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) market. In 
addition, six of the ten largest international EPC contractors currently operating in Africa are all 
Chinese, including China Communications Construction, China State Construction Engineering 
Corporation, Citic Construction Company, China Railway Group, China Railway Construction 
Corporation and Sinohydro Group (Sun et al., 2017, pp. 23-24). 
While the exact number of Chinese companies in Africa is still a hotly debated issue, a research project 
undertaken under the auspices of McKinsey & Co. shows that there are many more Chinese companies 
operating in Africa than has previously been estimated. In all eight African countries that were 
surveyed, it was discovered that the number of Chinese firms was between double and nine times the 
number captured by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) database, which was the largest 
database of Chinese firms in Africa. The same comparison with records of African countries’ 
investment authorities yielded similar multiples. Broad-brushed across the entire continent, the research 
suggests that there are more than 10,000 Chinese firms operating in Africa today (Sun et al., 2017, p. 
27). 
3.2 Key Institutions Involved in China’s Going Global Policy 
Chinese SOEs receive extensive support from the government of China which usually comes in the 
form of financing but also includes information and advisory services and establishing of contacts with 
African governments. Other companies that are owned by provincial governments as well as private 
companies also receive government help.  
Chris Alden and Martyn Davies report that:  
“A typical Chinese MNC has a business model heavily reliant upon political support, 
receives financial backing from the state and is involved in mining and energy industries. 
This characterization applies primarily to Chinese state-owned enterprises whose rapid 
entry into the global economy can be attributed to the financial support provided by the 
Chinese government. In pursuit of its broader global ambitions, Beijing is intent on 
‘picking corporate champions’ which, with the benefit of active and generous support 
from the state, are being groomed to join the ranks of the Fortune 500. Roughly 180 
companies have been designated the state to benefit from preferential finance, tax 
concessions and political backing to ‘go global’ and become true multinationals. 
Chinese companies have the advantage of building their businesses on the back of a 
booming home market and leveraging the economy of scale advantage that this 
provides” (Alden & Davies, 2006, p. 3). 
Several government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce, National 
Development and Reform Commission (NRDC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
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(SAFE) have all introduced policies to encourage and support Chinese companies in their 
internationalization efforts. Financial institutions like the China Development Bank, the China Exim 
Bank, Sinosure and Bank of China offer foreign exchange, loans and insurance services to Chinese 
companies. 
China’s State Assets Supervision and Administration Control (SASAC) has compiled a list of 166 
Chinese multinational companies, state-owned or otherwise, which have been deemed “flagship 
enterprises”. These companies can expect to receive preferential treatment from the Chinese 
government and include companies such as China Overseas Engineering Corporation (COVEC), China 
Roads and Bridges Corporation (CRBC) and China Railway Construction (CRC), which are all active 
on the African continent. Usually, bids that are seen as too costly by other western companies are 
pursued by these Chinese multinationals, especially when such projects are considered strategically 
important. They can afford to take on these projects as they receive additional public sector backing 
(Corkin & Burke, 2006, p. 11). 
The proliferation of Chinese enterprises in Africa is therefore not a product of circumstance but instead, 
the result of a well-executed and coordinated strategy by the Chinese government, combining political 
will and goals with a wide range of mechanisms and resources comprising of political and financial 
institutions. This system is designed to enhance the mutual support of all actors involved and to 
coordinate their actions and intents and it is within this institutional infrastructure that Chinese firms 
are encouraged to go abroad.  
A sizeable amount of central government administrative departments are tasked with the responsibility 
of policy making regarding China’s outward investment activities. Through a compilation of policies 
on overseas investment and an analysis of the agencies responsible for issuing these policies, Huang 
Wenbin and Andreas Wilkes indicate that there are 26 central government agencies involved in the 
policy making process. They classified these central government agencies into four general levels as 
depicted in Figure 1. At the very top of the pyramid is the State Council, which is responsible for the 
overall management of China’s government and significant decisions affecting the economy and 
society. The second level includes the core ministerial-level agencies who are mainly involved with 
overseas investment management. Examples include the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the 
State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) which has been historically responsible for approving overseas investments and 
has even been informally referred to as the “small state council” was also considered part of this second 
level. The third level comprises those functional departments responsible for various fields such as 
finance and taxation. They are mainly tasked with assisting the core ministries to ensure that the 
policies are coordinated with other existing policies, and to assist in issuing and implementing the 
policies. The fourth and final level includes mostly line ministries responsible for specific sectors such 
as mining, agriculture and forestry. While each of these ministries is directly in charge of policies 
within its own sector, they are less influential in determining overseas investment policy affecting its 
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sector. In addition, there exist several departments under each of these ministries who also play 
important roles such as execution of polices (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. China’s OFDI Management System 
Source: Huang & Wilkes (2011). 
Note. SFA refers to State Forestry Administration, MOA refers to Ministry of Agriculture and SAOT 
refers to State Administration of Taxation. 
 
From an analysis of 30 years of relevant policies, the authors conclude that:  
“MOFCOM and SAFE are the most important agencies, having issued more than 50% of 
these policies. If the NDRC is included as a core ministerial agency, then this second 
level of authority accounts for 56.1% of the total number of OFDI-related policies issued. 
Although the State Council issued only 5.9% of policies, its influence is tremendous. 
Departments in the third level—the Ministry of Finance (MOF), China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC)—are also 
important, accounting for nearly 20% of the policies issued” (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 
2). 
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Figure 2. Proportion of Overseas Investment Policy Changes by Various Policymaking Agencies 
Source: Huang & Wilkes (2011). 
 
The main political and financial actors involved in encouraging and supporting the overseas 
investments of Chinese companies are as follows: 
3.2.1 The State Council 
The State Council is China’s cabinet. Headed by the Premier, it is responsible for directing 
policy-making at the national level. The State Council not only establishes the overall blueprint for 
OFDI but manages its implementation as well. It makes decisions regarding what priorities should be 
pursued and coordinates national economic development, manages foreign affairs, and concludes 
treaties. The State Council is also responsible for drafting laws and regulations (which then have to be 
approved by the National People’s Congress and the Standing Committee) and supervising China’s 
national ministries and other entities such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The State Council is also directly 
involved in the approval of overseas projects requiring very large amounts of foreign exchange or 
major investments in natural resources (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2012). The 
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state council only makes major and strategic economic and policy decisions while specific policy 
measures are undertaken by subordinate organs such as SAFE or MOFCOM (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 
2). 
Under the direct supervision of the State Council are several institutions like the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC) which has been responsible for approving OFDI projects by Chinese 
banks since 1992. There’s also the China Insurance Regulatory Commission which is also the 
examining, approving and supervising the establishment of overseas insurance organizations by 
Chinese insurance companies (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2012). 
3.2.2 The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
MOFCOM is probably the foremost institution involved in the internationalization of Chinese MNCs. 
It is a major entity at the central level in terms of its influence and control over foreign investment and 
aid (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2012). It’s main responsibilities with regard to 
Chinese overseas investments are: 
i. Supervision of Chinese outward investment by drafting and implementing policies and 
regulations, and by considering applications for approval of non-financial OFDI projects; 
ii. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on investment and trade treaties and representing 
China at the World Trade Organization and other international economic organizations; 
iii. Ensuring the alignment of China’s economic and trade laws with international treaties and 
agreements; and 
iv. Coordinating China’s foreign aid policy and other related funding and loan schemes 
(Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 3). 
Working under MOFCOM are several departments tasked with specific responsibilities as it pertains to 
Chinese MNCs. The first of these is the Department of West-Asia and African Affairs (DWAAA). The 
role of the DWAAA is to advise policymakers, encourage investment and disseminate information on 
political, social, legal and economic environment in African countries. Secondly, the Department of 
Foreign Economic Cooperation (DFEC) regulates all Chinese companies operating abroad. All Chinese 
companies actively investing on the African continent need to register with the DFEC as long as their 
investment surpasses $10,000. Additionally, the DFEC reserves the right to revoke the operating 
licenses of any Chinese company that fails to comply with MOC directives and regulations or Chinese 
Laws in general. The third department is the Department of Foreign Aid (DFA). The DFA is 
responsible for approving every aid project and bid by any Chinese corporation. In addition, the DFA 
facilitates the biding process, becomes the guarantor and overseer of the project once it kicks off, and is 
also responsible for implementing China’s foreign aid. The last department is the Economic and 
Commercial Counselor (ECC). The ECC is largely seen as the extended arm of the MOC overseas. The 
ECC is attached to Chinese Embassies in foreign countries where it plays a watchdog role by ensuring 
that Chinese companies comply with Chinese regulations, laws, policies and directives (Kachiga, 2013, 
pp. 79-80). All investments requiring the incorporation of a business entity outside of China must gain 
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the approval of MOFCOM.  
3.2.3 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
The MOF was established in 1949, and its main responsibilities include: 
i. Drafting development strategies, plans and policies for China’s fiscal and taxation sectors, 
and cooperating in the development of macro-economic policies based on forecast 
economic trends; 
ii. Drafting laws and regulations regarding fiscal, taxation and accounting management; 
iii. Managing the central government’s revenue and expenditures, including preparing the 
annual budget, supervising its use and reporting to the central government. 
The MOF is also in charge of negotiations and agreements regarding China’s overseas fiscal activities, 
such as debt (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 4). Its role in implementing China’s Africa policy is minor and 
limited to managing the budget for foreign aid expenditures in collaboration with MOFCOM and MFA 
(Hanauer & Morris, 2014, p. 25). 
3.2.4 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
SAFE was established in 1979 under the Bank of China, and is mainly responsible for administering 
the use and flow of foreign exchange. Previously, this responsibility was distributed across several 
ministries but with the establishment of SAFE, all of China’s foreign exchange controls are under its 
supervision. Authority over SAFE was moved from the Bank of China to the newly created central 
bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), but it still remained largely independent until a government 
restructure in 1998. This restructure strengthened SAFE’s OFDI mandate in four ways: 
i. Assuming responsibility for reporting balance of payments data to the State Council and 
the International Monetary Fund; 
ii. Making foreign exchange policy recommendations to the People’s Bank of China; 
iii. Overseeing the transfer of foreign exchange out of and into China under the capital account 
of the balance of payments; and  
iv. Managing China’s foreign exchange reserves (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 3). 
3.2.5 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
The NDRC, sometimes referred to by its previous name, the State Development and Reform 
Commission, is the main government body that designs, regulates and coordinates national economic 
development and industrial policy. Its functions include regulating government investments in domestic 
industries and developing “strategies, goals and policies to balance and optimize China’s overseas 
investments” (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, pp. 3-4). The NDRC’s objective is to create an advantageous 
environment for Chinese enterprises doing business in Africa. They support the setting up of 
inter-government investment cooperation institutions between China and African countries and 
promote Chinese-African economic and technological cooperation. Its executive body is the Foreign 
Investment Department. The NDRC also engages in tariff exemptions for exports from least developed 
countries in Africa (Li et al., 2012, p. 27). It has worked in collaboration with MOFCOM to publish a 
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host country catalogue that lists the countries for which the Chinese government subsidises OFDI 
(Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 4). It has also worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Commerce and General Administration of Customs to establish a tariff exemption group to decide a 
number of issues, which include the list of tariff exemption commodities, rules of origin and the 
implementation periods (Li et al., 2012, p. 27). The NDRC is also:  
“involved in the approval process for Chinese OFDI and large scale Chinese OFDI 
projects in industrial sectors such as natural resources and other projects involving 
large sums of foreign exchange need prior investment approval from the NDRC” (Huang 
& Wilkes, 2011, p. 4). 
Projects for resource development that require Chinese investment exceeding US$30 million as well as 
non-resource development projects that require investment amounts of more than $10 million must be 
approved by the NDRC, while resource development projects with investments of over US$200 million 
and non-resource projects requiring investments of over US$50 million must be reported by the NDRC 
to the State Council for Approval (Freeman, 2008, p. 8). 
3.2.6 China Export Import Bank (Exim Bank) 
The Export-Import Bank of China is one of the principal lending arms of the Chinese government. It 
was founded in 1994 and is fully owned by the state, with the central government guiding its operations. 
It is headquartered in Beijing, but has 25 domestic branches and four overseas institutions namely, the 
Paris Branch, Representative Office for Southern and Eastern Africa, Representative Office for 
Northern and Western Africa, and St. Petersburg Representative Office. The Exim Bank has 
established correspondent banking relationships with 1,408 banks in over 160 countries and regions 
worldwide. The bank’s main responsibilities are to facilitate the export and import of Chinese 
mechanical and electronic products, complete sets of equipment and new-and high-tech products, assist 
Chinese companies with comparative advantages in their offshore project contracting and outbound 
investment, and promote international economic cooperation and trade (Export-Import Bank of China, 
2016, pp. 24-25). 
3.2.7 China Development Bank 
Like the Exim Bank, the China Development Bank (CDB) was established in 1994. Its main mission 
has been to build China’s infrastructure including its national highway and rail networks, gas pipelines, 
water projects, and power plants as well as key economic sectors like petroleum-chemical refining, and 
telecommunications. The bank is also tasked with disbursing loans for Chinese businesses in pursuance 
of the “going global” strategy (Wang, 2007, p. 15). As of 2009, the CDB was active in 78 countries, 
implementing and promoting the going out strategy through offerings such as currency swaps, credits 
and loans, fund management, equity investment, merger and acquisition financing, and leasing 
operations. It is involved in overseas investment activities in infrastructure, basic industries, agriculture, 
small and medium-sized enterprises and housing (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
2012). 
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3.2.8 China-Africa Development Fund (CADF or CAD Fund)  
CAD Fund was established in 2007 to encourage Chinese enterprises to conduct trade and other 
economic activities in Africa. It is a subsidiary of CDB and also its principal source of funding. It is a 
market-oriented operating fund with 50-year duration. CAD Fund’s objective includes “to promote 
economic cooperation between China and Africa and advance Africa’s economic development”. It does 
this by investing directly in Chinese enterprises that have already set up operations in Africa and also 
providing funding for those that wish to do so. CAD Fund operates on market economy principles and 
is solely responsible for all its profits and losses. The Fund’s target group is Chinese enterprises who 
already operate in Africa or wish to invest in projects on the continent, as long as they comply with the 
laws, statutes and regulations of China and the recipient country which is being invested in. Financial 
support from the fund helps to support Chinese enterprises who experience capital shortage, but it also 
provides advisory services to Chinese enterprises who often lack experience in the African market. 
Based on market principles and the investment needs of specific African countries, CAD Fund seeks 
investment in sectors such as agriculture, machinery manufacturing, infrastructure, construction 
materials, trade zones and resources development. Management of CAD Fund are required to meet 
annually with representatives from various Chinese government ministries (Schickerling, 2012, p. 47). 
 
Table 1. Major Projects in Africa Financed by China-Africa Development Fund 
Country Project Remarks 
Ghana Power plant Phase—I capacity 200,000 kilowatts 
Egypt 
Suez Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Zone 
19 businesses already operating in the zone 
South Africa Cement Plant 
In cooperation with a South African firm; annual 
capacity of 1 million tons of cement 
South Africa 
Heavy-duty Truck 
Assembly plant 
Investment and operation in cooperation with a South 
African firm; annual capacity of 2000 commercial 
heavy-duty trucks 
Tanzania Sisal Plantation 
Sisal plantations operation and sisal yarn plant 
construction 
Ethiopia Cement Plant 
Investment in construction; annual capacity of 
500,000 tons of cement 
Source: China-Africa Research Center (2011). 
 
3.2.9 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)  
The CSRC was set up in 1990 as a ministerial level agency to manage the country’s security and 
futures markets. With regards to outward investment, it is responsible for approving and supervising 
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Chinese companies’ overseas stock issues and debenture activities, stock market listings and related 
financial activities. However, the agency’s actual role in supervising overseas listings is limited to 
making suggestions and providing coordination while most of the supervisory work is undertaken by 
the responsible departments in the location of the listing (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 4). 
3.2.10 State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
SASAC was established by the State Council and tasked with the responsibility of supervising the 
non-financial state-owned enterprises. As a direct representative of the Chinese government, owner and 
investor in state-owned enterprises, SASAC has wide-reaching responsibilities and powers. Before 
SASAC was established, its responsibilities were divided between the State Economic Trade 
Commission and several ministries and other government agencies that controlled and supervised their 
respective sectors. This situation sometimes resulted in state-owned enterprises competing amongst 
themselves, hence the creation of SASAC (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 5). 
As an investor, SASAC is mostly concerned with ensuring the competitiveness and profitability of 
state-owned enterprises under its supervision. SASAC is comprised of two levels: the national level 
which directly controls 120 national state-owned enterprises, and the subnational level which act at a 
provincial level. SASAC is directly involved in the major decision making of firms under their control. 
They do this by appointing senior managers to state-owned enterprises. A sizeable amount of senior 
managers are actually appointed directly by the Chinese Communist Party. Outward investment 
projects by state-owned enterprises under the supervision of SASAC usually require the approval of 
SASAC (Huang & Wilkes, 2011, p. 5). Examples of Chinese companies investing overseas under the 
direct control of SASAC include: China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinochem Corporation, China State Construction Engineering 
Corporation, China Minmetals Corporation, China Cereals, Oils and Foods Company (COFCO) and 
TCL (through SASAC’s holdings in Huizhou Municipal Investment Holdings). All of the 
aforementioned companies are ranked among the top 100 developing country multinational enterprises. 
SASAC also controls smaller state-owned enterprises such as China Aviation Oil and Sinosteel (Huang 
& Wilkes, 2011, p. 5). 
3.2.11 China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SINOSURE) 
SINOSURE was established in 2001 and its main objective is to support Chinese exports and 
investment abroad by insuring against buyer and country risks. These risks include foreign exchange 
restrictions expropriation, nationalization and war. SINOSURE’s total volume of new business reached 
$29.4 billion in 2006, up from just $2.8 billion in 2002. Even though Africa represented only 3 percent 
of its short-term insurance in 2006, it still accounted for nearly 30 percent of SINOSURE’s medium 
and long-term business, second only to Asia (Wang, 2007, p. 16). While the leading four countries for 
short-term insurance were the United States, Hong Kong, Japan and Germany, the leading market for 
medium and long-term insurance were Sudan, Pakistan, Iran and the Philippines. In 2006, the total 
insured amount for medium and long-term export credit, both buyer and supplier credits, was US$2.6 
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billion, though it had declined by 6.5% compared with the previous year (Freeman, 2008, p. 10). 
3.2.12 China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) 
The CCPIT is dedicated to promoting cooperation between Chinese and African entrepreneurs. During 
ministerial conferences of FOCAC, the CCPIT convenes the China-Africa business sub-forum to 
stimulate pragmatic bilateral cooperation. Its executive body is the Department of International Liaison. 
Under the leadership of the CCPIT, the China-Africa joint chamber facilitated activities to improve 
mutual cooperation (Li et al., 2012, p. 27). 
3.2.13 Chinese Embassies and Consulates 
In a document drafted by MOFCOM in 2006 titled Encouraging and Supporting “Go-Global” of 
Privately Owned Enterprises, the role of Chinese embassies and consulates in host countries were 
spelled out as follows:  
“Chinese embassies and consulates should assist private enterprises in acquiring 
information regarding the countries in which they are located, proactively build 
connections for enterprises to ‘go global’, and help enterprises to overcome difficulties. 
They should guide Chinese-funded enterprises in conducting business in compliance with 
the law. They should organize and establish chambers of commerce for Chinese-funded 
enterprises overseas as well as attract private enterprises to join the chambers of 
commerce. To facilitate problem solving, they should strengthen consultation and 
negotiation with governments in the countries in which they are located in regards to 
obstacles encountered by business personnel in exiting and entering certain countries, 
difficulty in acquiring visas, etc. Consular protection should be strengthened to 
safeguard the legal rights of Chinese-funded enterprises and their personnel overseas. 
Enterprises should also be given guidance in formulating safety protection measures to 
increase their capacity to safeguard their personnel and assets as well as handle 
unexpected incidents. Private enterprises should proactively communicate with and 
report information to Chinese embassies (consulates) and accept guidance from 
embassies (consulates)” (MOFCOM, 2006). 
The institutional frameworks of all these ministries, departments and institutions is woven into the 
larger Chinese political hierarchy and is hinged on collaboration with other relevant ministries and 
departments such as the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. These 
ministries and departments all conjointly or individually report to the state council (Shinn & Eisenman, 
2013, p. 80). The implementation of the Going Global strategy has in no small way fueled and 
propelled Chinese companies to look towards the global landscape. Moreover, it has provided great 
impetus for a diversity of policy initiatives that has opened a new chapter for the overseas investment 
of Chinese companies in Africa. But what are the underlying motives driving China’s going-global 
policy in Africa? The next section will attempt to address this question. 
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4. Discussion 
Chinese government support for the internationalization efforts of Chinese companies is therefore a 
recurring theme which has no doubt played a crucial role in expanding the scope and scale of Chinese 
business activities in Africa. As demonstrated above, government ministries and agencies as well as a 
string of financial institutions have been an instrumental part of this strategy. Several key motives and 
drivers account for this comprehensive strategy. Among the more common ones are: 
4.1 Resource Acquisition 
Due to a massive domestic investment, rapid urbanization and production for domestic and foreign 
consumption, China has witnessed an unprecedented demand for resources such as oil, iron ore, copper 
and aluminum. China is presently consuming more than 25% of the world’s total annual production of 
minerals. It is forecasted that China’s dependence on imported oil and gas will rise from 51.2% and 
5.8% in 2008 to 60% and 30% in 2015, and continue to grow to 70% and 50% in 2030. This huge 
demand cannot be sustained by domestic production alone, given China’s limited domestic deposits of 
most resources, and so the threat of severe resource shortage is a real issue for China’s policy makers. 
It is no surprise then that energy exploitation and development have consistently been at the forefront 
of China’s OFDI drive, accounting for 70% of the total value from 2005-2013 (Du, 2014, pp. 
1130-1131).  
Of particular importance to China is access to energy resources. According to a study by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), China is well aware of its growing dependency on imported 
energy and is therefore taking the necessary steps to secure “a more prominent position in the existing 
global system of energy production and trade but, where it can, it tries to open new connections in the 
global markets” (International Energy Agency, 2000, p. 47). The study also adds that increasingly, 
China’s external energy policies come to form a subset of foreign economic and security policies in 
general. It cites the aggressive recent foreign investments of China’s state owned enterprises, notably 
CNPC and CNOOC as a direct consequence of a May 1997 policy paper in which former Premier Li 
Peng “blessed Chinese involvement in the exploration and development of international oil and gas 
resources” and also “tied such projects specifically to the objective of stable, long-term supplies of oil 
and gas”. The study concludes that China is increasingly aware of the fact that its diplomatic goals with 
respect to energy, primarily oil and gas, must “aim toward participation in the global energy system in 
a way that maximizes domestic energy security” (International Energy Agency, 2000, p. 10). 
The Chinese government’s need to secure much needed resources to fuel China’s burgeoning economic 
growth is therefore a huge impetus for the Chinese government to aggressively pursue oil and 
numerous other natural resource commodities in Africa. China has already assumed the status of 
second-largest importer of oil in the world, and coupled with a declining domestic production of oil, as 
well as the increasing need to sustain economic growth, the Chinese government has had to take steps 
to explore long-term deals with African governments in order to ensure an uninterrupted access to 
much needed raw materials, especially energy resources like oil. In essence, China’s search for energy 
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security has become the chief, overarching driver of its foreign policy push in Africa, which has long 
assumed a major role in this objective, and much of this focus is evidenced by specific policy initiatives 
such as the Going Global policy. 
4.2 New Markets  
For many Chinese manufacturers and entrepreneurs, the types of goods they produce and sell has 
immense value in Africa. These include affordable electronics, household appliances, apparel, and 
other domestic goods. Since Africa’s economy is less developed than that of the West, such 
inexpensive products get a much better reception there. Besides, due to the low level of 
industrialization in Africa, there exist little to no competition in some industries. This is a big draw for 
Chinese companies who can immediately command a large share of the market. 
In addition, due to the opening up and reform measures initiated by then President Deng Xiaoping, 
China has increasingly become a destination of choice for foreign firms wishing to lower production 
costs and expand their markets. This, coupled with increased domestic competition has meant that 
Chinese firms are finding it increasingly tough to do business in their home country. A KPMG report 
targeting foreign firms operating in China interviewed a number of senior executives over a range of 
sectors about the challenges and opportunities of operating in China. Such opinions as “growth 
slowing”, “costs rising” and “China being an increasingly expensive place to do business” were 
reported. This could be seen as the beginning of a shift in the world’s production chain with China 
moving up the value chain (Ahmed, 2013, p. 51).  
A study by IBM Business Consulting Services notes:  
“In aggregate, the majority of profits in China disproportionately flow to highly 
regulated, highly concentrated industries such as oil and gas, mining and 
telecommunications services that are primarily controlled by SOEs. In contrast, many 
manufacturing sectors are deregulating, hindered by overcapacity and facing intense 
profit pressures. As a result, Chinese manufacturers are naturally looking abroad for 
new markets with less competition and higher profit potential” (IBM Consulting 
Services, 2006, pp. 4-5). 
4.3 Diversification 
Another motivation for China’s going-global policy is the need for Chinese multinationals to diversify 
as a way of spreading risk. Expansion into the African market is a way of diversifying the markets for 
their products in the global economy. In this regard, the Chinese government also encourages 
companies to enter into new markets and to use foreign market access as a way of getting around trade 
barriers by foreign countries. For example, after the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act, Chinese companies began setting up textile factories in Africa in order to gain entry into the U.S 
market. 
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4.4 Strategic Assets 
It has become necessary for Chinese companies, especially State-Owned Enterprises to obtain strategic 
assets as they become part of the global economy. This is especially crucial for companies in the 
energy sector, who with government assistance are able to purchase a myriad of operations in strategic 
locations without having to worry about cost efficiency. This has been the case in Africa where 
Chinese companies have been obtaining strategic assets from failing investments within the energy 
sector.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is certainly no doubt that with its going global policy, China is pursuing its own self-interests. 
However, tangible potential benefits exist for all stakeholders. African states will gain much needed 
foreign investment to bolster economic growth, diversify their economies and climb up the global value 
chain. The Chinese government stands to benefit from continued, uninterrupted access to natural 
resources, while improving its relations with African states through the strengthening of its diplomatic 
standing, which will go a long way towards actualizing the political partnership it needs to counter 
Western influence and enhance its standing within the international stage. Chinese companies will gain 
much needed international experience and move closer towards their internationalization aspirations. 
Additionally, African markets present huge opportunities for expanding revenues and profits, reducing 
risk through diversificationas well as reducing costs by taking advantage of cheap labor and raw 
materials. 
Overall, China’s investments on the continent have contributed to African development while helping 
China to diversify its external assets, most of which are tied up in foreign treasury bonds with relatively 
low yields. It has also increasing led to a change in public policy, from a more myopic focus on trade 
and investment in a few sectors to a more diverse and broad-ranging engagement. Chinese investments 
in Africa have not only spurred the growth of Chinese firms but has also enhanced Africa’s economic 
development through the upgrade of industrial technology, provision of jobs, increase in foreign 
exchange earnings, development of infrastructure, knowledge transfer, and economic diversification. 
Thus, China Africa relations under its current form as well as its future outlook appears to be ripe with 
opportunity, not only for China and its armada of multinationals, but for African states as well. What 
remains to be seen is if African governments across the continent can ensure that their own key 
interests are captured within this engagement. This is the challenge faced by African countries, but 
within which exists the opportunity to enhance the pace of economic development and improve the 
quality of life of its people. However, several issues need to be tackled in order for both parties to 
realize the full potential in this engagement. Many African governments now possess adequate leverage 
to not only negotiate with China on equal terms, but also spell out the terms of any agreements. China 
has time and again reiterated its commitment to a mutually beneficial and win-win partnership. The 
onus lies on African states to engage China in a way that will compliment their domestic growth and 
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development strategies. A starting point will be encouraging Chinese companies to establish joint 
ventures with local firms, use local materials and labor, reinvest profits in the local economy and share 
technical know-how. This way, engagement with China will not only serve to benefit the Chinese side, 
but will also work towards cultivating and harnessing the development of the local economy, with the 
aim to improve the quality of life of Africans. 
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